Diffusion of multiple information: On information resilience and the power of segregation by Tabasso, Nicole
Diffusion of Multiple Information: On Information
Resilience and the Power of Segregation?
Nicole Tabassoa
aUniversity of Surrey, Guildford, GU2 7XH, UK;
Ca’Foscari University of Venice, Venice, Italy
Abstract
We introduce two pieces of information (memes) into a diffusion process in which
memes are transmitted when agents meet and forgotten at an exogenous rate.
At most one meme can be transmitted at each meeting, which one depends
on preferences over memes. We find that the conditions under which a unique
meme becomes endemic are sufficient for both to become endemic. Segregation
according to information preferences leads to polarization, i.e., nobody is in-
formed of both memes, and a loss of information. We show how the likelihood
of segregation depends on information preferences and on parameters of the
diffusion process.
Keywords: Social Networks, Information Transmission, Multiple States,
Segregation
JEL: D83, D85
?Many thanks for valuable comments, discussions and suggestions go to Rabah Amir, Irem
Bozbay, Andrea Galeotti, Manolis Galenianos, Alex Gershkov, Christian Ghiglino, Alberto
Vesperoni and three anonymous referees, as well as seminar participants at the Copenhagen
Business School, USL, Paris 1, Surrey School of Economics, APET 2014, EEA 2014, UECE
2014, CTN 2015, and the Second Annual Conference on Network Science and Economics 2016.
An early version of this paper circulated under the title “Diffusion of Multiple Information”
as a Surrey Discussion Paper.
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and
innovation programme under the Marie Sk lodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 793769.
Email address: n.tabasso@surrey.ac.uk (Nicole Tabasso)
Preprint submitted to Elsevier September 24, 2019
1. Introduction
Since the seminal works of Lazarsfeld et al. (1948) and Katz and Lazarsfeld
(1955), the importance of social networks in the diffusion of information has
been well documented. It is less well known how different pieces of information,
or memes,1 interact in this diffusion process. In the production of news, such
as in print or TV media, it is obvious that fixed coverage space is shared by
different news stories. Arguments about politicians aiming to “bury” unfavor-
able news arise from this. In the social diffusion process, a similar constraint is
present: Communication time is limited and has to be shared among everything
an individual talks about. Making use of Twitter data, Leskovec et al. (2009)
and Weng et al. (2012) have shown that the total volume of tweets is roughly
constant over time, despite significant variation in the topics of tweets. In ad-
dition, their data shows that (i) at any point in time numerous hashtags diffuse
simultaneously, (ii) there are significant differences in the number of times a
hashtag is retweeted, and (iii) hashtags crowd each other out. Diffusion models
of a unique information are not equipped to explain these patterns. Similarly,
it is not clear that these patterns are necessarily due to strategic choices in the
transmission of memes. The sheer volume of topics that are being transmitted
online suggests that, if agents face a choice about which meme to transmit,
this choice may well be between memes of entirely unrelated topics, for which
strategic considerations appear unlikely.2
The present paper introduces a parsimonious diffusion model of multiple
memes under a communication constraint, which reproduces the above patterns.
To keep the analysis tractable and to isolate the effect of limited communication
1The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines a meme as “an idea, behavior, style, or usage
that spreads from person to person within a culture”. It therefore provides a meaningful way
to talk about pieces or bits of information.
2Consider this concrete example: According to the NIFTY project, which tracks memes on
Twitter, in April 2015 the two most frequently tweeted memes were ”Star Wars: The Force
Awakens” (relating to the trailer release of the movie) and ”A Rape on Campus” (relating to
the veracity of a journal article). It is unlikely that strategic considerations played a role in
the decision to tweet one as opposed to the other of these. Other months similarly showcase
the breadth of topics that diffuse simultaneously online.
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time, we build on a standard diffusion process with epidemiological roots, the
Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) framework.3 In the model, each period
each agent randomly meets a subset of other agents. At any meeting, there is
a chance that communication occurs, in which case an informed agent passes
a meme on. Agents forget memes at an exogenous rate. The novelty of our
process lies in the existence of two memes. At each meeting, if communication
occurs, each agent can pass on only one meme. Within the model, the choice of
what to talk about is determined by intrinsic information preferences of agents,
capturing the idea that individuals are more likely to talk about things that
interest them more.
Within a mean-field approximation of this process, the literature has estab-
lished the conditions under which a single meme exhibits a positive steady-state,
in which a constant fraction of the population is informed about it in the long
run. In our first main result, we show that the conditions that guarantee exis-
tence, uniqueness, and stability of a positive steady-state for either meme in our
model are identical to the ones previously derived. That is, we show that infor-
mation is extremely resilient. This result notwithstanding, we are able to rank
information steady-states according to interest: The meme that is preferred by
the majority of the population will exhibit a higher steady-state. We also show
that crowding out of information always occurs.
The resilience of information occurs in a society in which all agents interact
randomly. Instead, it is well documented that individuals exhibit homophily, a
tendency to interact relatively more with others that are similar to themselves.
We show that segregation according to information preferences leads to a seg-
regation of information: If groups do not interact with each other, within each
group, only the preferred meme exhibits a positive steady-state. Interestingly,
both memes exhibit lower steady-states in a segregated society than in a fully
integrated one, i.e., segregation leads to a loss of information overall.
3Within economics, this process has been employed by, e.g., Jackson and Rogers (2007b),
Lo´pez-Pintado (2008), Jackson and Yariv (2010), and Jackson and Lo´pez-Pintado (2013),
among others.
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While segregation implies a loss of information, we find that it increases the
fraction of the population informed about their preferred meme. Given this
result, we extend our model to endow agents with specific utilities from being
informed. In particular, we assume that being informed with the preferred
meme provides a utility flow that is larger than the utility flow of being informed
with the alternative meme. This extension allows us to analyze the factors that
influence the likelihood of segregation, as opposed to focusing only on its impact.
In fact, segregation may be a Nash equilibrium in our model. We find that
the likelihood of observing a segregated society is increasing in the extremism
of information preferences, and that it tends to be driven by members of the
smaller group. Segregation is less likely to be an equilibrium the more meetings
agents have per period, ceteris paribus.
2. Related Literature
Our paper is part of a growing literature that studies diffusion processes
on networks. The model we introduce is a direct extension of the SIS frame-
work that has been employed by various authors, among them Jackson and
Rogers (2007b), Lo´pez-Pintado (2008), Jackson and Yariv (2010), Galeotti and
Rogers (2013) and Galeotti and Rogers (2015), as well as Izquierdo et al. (2018).
This literature itself builds on work on epidemiological and contagion models
in the natural sciences, such as Bailey (1975), Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani
(2001a,b), Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani (2002), Watts (2002), or Dodds and
Watts (2004).4 The simultaneous diffusion of multiple states in this framework
has been addressed by Pathak et al. (2010), Karrer and Newman (2011), Beutel
et al. (2012) and Prakash et al. (2012). In contrast to the present paper, in
these models infection with one virus/state provides full or partial immunity
4More broadly, the paper is also related to network processes of learning, best response
dynamics, or explicit adoption decisions. These processes however differ significantly from the
SIS model we employ. See, e.g., Jackson (2008) or Goyal (2012) for an excellent introduction
to the literature, as well as Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2011) for a recent overview of models of
belief and opinion dynamics.
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against the other. Such immunity introduces a tendency for the more viru-
lent state to be the only one that survives in the population. This result is in
stark contrast to our findings of information resilience. Resilience seems to be
corroborated by the vast array of different topics that diffuse simultaneously
on online social networks. The difference in the results is interesting from a
technical point of view, as it highlights the importance of the stage at which
the diffusion constraint is placed (i.e., whether on the infection or on the trans-
mission likelihood). To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first that
introduces two distinct pieces of information / memes that compete for lim-
ited communication time into the SIS framework. Outside this framwork and
complementary to our paper, Campbell et al. (2019) model the simultaneous
diffusion of “mainstream” and “niche” content on a network. The decision of
which type of content to transmit is modeled in the same way as in our paper,
but all communicating agents are informed of at least one type of content. This
creates a different evolutionary dynamic, in which the focus lies on transmission
rather than awareness of information.
Diffusion of competing products or innovations has been analyzed in models
of influence maximization, e.g., by Dubey et al. (2006), Bharathi et al. (2007),
Borodin et al. (2010) and Goyal et al. (2019). These models differ significantly
from an SIS diffusion process, both with respect to the modelling characteris-
tics, and the questions that they aim to answer. The above papers are based
on threshold models, in which contagion occurs on a fixed network and nodes
never recover. The central question in this strand of literature is which nodes a
player with a fixed budget would choose to infect to maximize the contagion of
his product. In Goyal et al. (2019), e.g., the focus is on how the efficiency of a
“seeding” strategy depends on the precise diffusion process and its interaction
with the network structure. A paper that does employ a random network is
Jime´nez-Mart´ınez (2019). Their analysis highlights that adoption of a product
may be driven simply by the number of neighbors instead of their respective
adoption choice, reminiscent of how information spreads in our own model.
Similarly to previous work on the diffusion of multiple states in the SIS model,
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in all of these papers being infected with one product precludes infection with
another, differently from our model. Strategic targeting, albeit in a different
framework, is also the focus of Grabisch et al. (2017). The authors investigate
which nodes should be targeted by strategic agents with opposing (fixed) beliefs
that wish to influence the average opinion in a DeGroot model (DeGroot, 1974).
We are also related to the literature that has investigated the impact that ho-
mophily has on information diffusion and its potential to lead to polarization.
In existing models, homophily may either hinder diffusion, as in Granovetter
(1973) and Golub and Jackson (2012), or be beneficial, as in the adoption of
a behavior in Jackson and Lo´pez-Pintado (2013). Studies such as Rosenblat
and Mobius (2004), Sunstein (2009), Baccara and Yariv (2010), Gentzkow and
Shapiro (2011) or Flaxman et al. (2013) have investigated the relationship be-
tween homophily and polarization. The focus of these studies has been predomi-
nantly the impact of biased news/information consumption, and its potential to
lead to polarization. Given the rise in internet usage, an important question is
whether this rise might increase segregation and hence polarization. Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2011) and Flaxman et al. (2013) find that online news consumption
is not substantially more segregated than offline consumption of news, provid-
ing an argument against a link between internet usage and polarization. On
the other hand, in a more recent paper Halberstam and Knight (2016) investi-
gate homophily among Twitter users, which is used both as an Online Social
Network (OSN) and as a tool to consume news. They find higher levels of ho-
mophily for the social network aspect. Our results on the importance of biases
in social interactions, as opposed to news consumption, complement those of
Halberstam and Knight (2016). Indeed, in our model, a complete segregation
in communication according to type will lead to a situation in which all agents
are only informed of their preferred meme. This is independent of the initial
seeding of information, which may proxy as consumption of news. Our results
are indicative that a driving force of polarization may be biased communication
patterns as opposed to biased news consumption.
We do not model links as costly. Homophily has been shown to arise en-
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dogenously if links to the same types are cheaper than links to agents of another
type (Jackson and Rogers, 2005; Galeotti et al., 2006; Dev, 2018), if the meet-
ing process is biased (Jackson and Rogers, 2007a; Bramoulle´ et al., 2012), or
if preferences are biased towards links within the same group such as in Cur-
rarini et al. (2009) or Currarini et al. (2010). In our model, own-type links
may provide greater benefits than links across types as agents are more likely
to become informed of their preferred meme, thus adding a different rationale
why own-type links may be preferred.
While we model communication of memes, the choice of which message to
transmit is non-strategic. Strategic information transmission has been the sub-
ject of, e.g., Hagenbach and Koessler (2010), Galeotti et al. (2013), or Bloch
et al. (2018).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 presents the model
and derives the steady-states of each meme, in particular, our result on infor-
mation resilience. Section 4 relates the ranking of steady-states to information
preferences and to network characteristics. Section 5 investigates the impact of
homophily and derives the conditions under which agents themselves wish to
segregate according to information interests. Section 6 provides extensions to
the main model and Section 7 concludes. Various proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
3. The Model
3.1. Propagation Mechanism
There exists an infinite number of agents, indexed by i, who represent nodes
of a network. Time is continuous. Meetings between agents signify links, and
the degree of agent i, ki, denotes the number of meetings that i has at each point
in time. The distribution of degrees is P , such that P (k) is the probability that
a randomly drawn node has degree k. A fraction ga ∈ [0, 1] of the population
belongs to group A and the complement gb = 1−ga belongs to group B. Group
membership determines informational preferences: There exist two memes, A
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and B, and members of group A prefer meme A to meme B, and vice versa. We
assume that these preferences are common knowledge and that they encompass
both the consumption and the transmission of information, such that an agent
who, e.g., prefers the topic of football over political news prefers both to talk
about the most recent football results and to hear about them. We assume
that memes A and B are independent of each other, as with football news as
opposed to political news. With the exception of informational preferences,
there is no difference between members of the two groups, an assumption that
will be relaxed in Section 6.
Agents can be uninformed of both memes (susceptible, S), or informed of
either or both. We denote being informed of meme A only by Ia\b, and being
informed of only B by Ib\a, while being informed of both memes by Iab. Thus,
the set of states in which an agent can be is {S, Ia\b, Ib\a, Iab}. Transition
between states occurs in the following way. Agents in S transition into Ia\b if
they become informed of meme A and into Ib\a if they become informed of meme
B. Agents in Ia\b (Ib\a) transition into Iab if they become informed of meme
B (A). Similarly, they transition into S if they forget A (B). Agents in IAB
transition into Ia\b (Ib\a) if they forget meme B (A). We denote by ν the rate at
which information is transmitted at a meeting and by δ the rate at which it is
forgotten. In line with the previous literature and the epidemiological roots of
the model, we refer to ν as the (per contact) infection rate and δ as the recovery
rate.5
A central assumption is that at each meeting agents can communicate at
most one meme, as communication time is limited. We assume that in this
case, an agent transmits his preferred meme, conditional on communication
taking place at all.6 Note that if agents are either in state Ia\b or Ib\a, their
5If agents never forgot, all information would eventually be known by everybody. Apart
from being uninteresting, this does not seem to be a relevant case for many of the memes that
diffuse through social interactions. Much of the information that is transmitted as chit-chat
is not immediately payoff relevant. Such information may be a prime target to be forgotten
under memory limitations.
6This implies that a fraction gl of agents in state Iab will transmit meme l. Our results
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information preferences will not matter for the rate at which they pass on meme
l. In particular, agents are non-strategic in the way they pass on information.
They neither distort the meme they possess, nor do they strategically choose
to not transmit a meme. Aside from strategic considerations, other reasonable
frameworks to model information transmission clearly exist. It is worthwhile
highlighting that any such framework in which the existence of a second meme
does not impose any restriction on the transmission of the first and vice versa
will lead to a parallel diffusion of the memes in which each meme’s diffusion can
be studied individually. The standard one meme SIS model then applies.7 The
present model is kept deliberately simple with respect to further intricacies of
the transmission process of memes to clearly identify the role that competition
between memes in communication plays. Section 6 discusses the relaxation of
some of the simplifying assumptions employed here.
Following the literature, we model the diffusion of the memes under the
assumption that the network of meetings is realized every period and we solve for
the mean-field approximation of the system. Formally, we define ρa\b(k), ρb\a(k)
and ρab(k) as the proportion of degree-k agents in the three infection states,
Ia\b, Ib\a, and Iab, respectively. We denote the corresponding prevalences in the
population overall as ρa\b =
∑
k P (k)ρa\b(k), ρb\a =
∑
k P (k)ρb\a(k) and ρab =∑
k P (k)ρab(k). By definition, ρa(k) = ρa\b(k)+ρab(k), ρb(k) = ρb\a(k)+ρab(k),
and ρ(k) = ρa\b(k) + ρb\a(k) + ρab(k), with equivalent relationships for overall
prevalences.
Let 〈·〉 denote the expectation operator. Given the distribution of degrees,
P (k), the probability that a randomly encountered node has degree k is P˜ (k) =
P (k)k
〈k〉 . Our assumption that both groups are identical except for informational
will not change if we instead assume that gl is the probability that a single agent in state Iab
passes on information l. This assumption would not allow us to investigate questions of the
effect of segregation according to information preferences.
7An intuitive example is a model in which the rate at which an agent communicates a
meme depends on his type, such that an agent of type l communicates meme l at rate νl and
meme −l at rate ν-l with νl > ν-l. Given group sizes ga and gb, such a transmission protocol
would be identical to a model in which meme A is being transmitted at rate νA = gAνl+gBν-l
and meme B at rate νB = gAν-l + gBνl in a parallel fashion.
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preferences extends to the distribution of degrees, i.e., P (k) = Pa(k) = Pb(k).
It also extends to interaction patterns across groups being random, i.e., agents
of either group meet members of the same / the other group at a rate that
is determined by the relative sizes of the groups. Currarini et al. (2009) term
such interactions baseline homophily. While many social interactions exhibit a
tendency towards homophily beyond this level, we believe that this assumption
captures well the fact that social networks are likely to have formed long before
any particular pair of memes diffuses on them. In this case, we do expect that
the degree of homophily of the network is unrelated to the types of currently
diffusing memes. Denote by θl the probability that a randomly encountered
agent will transmit meme l for l ∈ {A,B}, if communication occurs. Then,
θa =
∑
k
P˜ (k) [ρa(k)− gbρab(k)] , (1)
θb =
∑
k
P˜ (k) [ρb(k)− gaρab(k)] . (2)
In the SIS model with only one meme, θl is equal to the probability that a
randomly encountered node is informed of meme l. Equations (1) and (2),
instead, show that in the present model, for gl ∈ (0, 1) and ρab(k) > 0, θl
is strictly lower than this probability. Thus, in our model the probability of
becoming informed of either meme is lower than in the standard SIS model.
Note that ρa(k), ρb(k), and ρab(k) are the same in either group. This is an
outcome of our assumption that interactions are random across groups and
it leads to the result that a fraction gl of informed agents (whether in ρa(k),
ρb(k), or ρab(k)) belongs to group l, which increases the tractability of the model
tremendously.8
Following the standard SIS model with a unique meme, we assume that
the infection rate ν is sufficiently small that it approximates the chance that an
agent becomes informed through his k independent interactions at t. The rate
8We return to this point in more detail in Section 5, where we look at the implications of
different levels of homophily.
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at which a susceptible agent becomes infected with either meme l is then kνθl.
Similarly, we assume that the recovery rate δ is sufficiently small such that δ
approximates the probability that an agent forgets a particular meme at time
t.9
As A and B are about independent topics, we assume that the two memes
diffuse through the population independently of each other. Knowledge of one
does not make knowledge of the other any more or less likely. The propagation
process exhibits a steady-state if the following three differential equations are
satisfied,
∂ρa(k)
∂t
= (1− ρa(k))kνθa − ρa(k)δ = 0, (3)
∂ρb(k)
∂t
= (1− ρb(k))kνθb − ρb(k)δ = 0, (4)
∂ρab(k)
∂t
= (ρa(k)− ρab(k))kνθb + (5)
+(ρb(k)− ρab(k))kνθa − 2ρab(k)δ = 0,
i.e., the proportion of agents who become aware of a meme at t equals the
proportion of agents who forget it.10
9In essence, this assumption implies that at most one information is forgotten at any
t. This seems reasonable for short time intervals. Importantly, as at most one meme can
be transmitted per meeting, it ensures that the setup is not exogenously biased against the
survival of a meme.
10We assume that δ is the unique rate at which both A and B are forgotten. There are
numerous alternative ways to model forgetting, e.g., the preferred meme might be forgotten
at a lower rate, or being aware of multiple memes increases the rate at which all of them
are forgotten. On the other hand, it might also be the complexity of a meme that is the
determining factor in forgetting, something that is entirely exogenous to the model. In this
case, the steady-state prevalences of the two memes would differ by construction. Instead, the
unique value of δ allows us to derive very cleanly the impact that the existence of a second
meme has on the diffusion process, without additional complications.
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3.2. Steady-States
Define λ = νδ as the diffusion rate of information. The steady-state condi-
tions of ρa(k), ρb(k), and ρab(k) can be written as
ρa(k) =
kλθa
1 + kλθa
, (6)
ρb(k) =
kλθb
1 + kλθb
, (7)
ρab(k) =
k2λ2θaθb
(1 + kλθa)(1 + kλθb)
= ρa(k)ρb(k), (8)
and substitution of these conditions into equations (1) and (2) yields:
HA(θa, θb) =
∑
k
P˜ (k)
kλθa
1 + kλθa
[
1− gb kλθb
1 + kλθb
]
, (9)
HB(θa, θb) =
∑
k
P˜ (k)
kλθb
1 + kλθb
[
1− ga kλθa
1 + kλθa
]
. (10)
Denote the steady-state values of θa and θb as θ¯a and θ¯b, respectively. These are
determined as the fixed points such that θ¯a = H
A(θ¯a, θ¯b) and θ¯b = H
B(θ¯a, θ¯b),
which by equations (6)-(8) determine the steady-states of ρl(k) (and hence ρl)
for l ∈ {A,B}, which we denote by ρ¯l(k) and ρ¯. Due to the inherent symmetry
of the model, in the remainder of the paper we focus, without loss of generality,
on the case in which ga ≥ gb.
Remark 1. For any given diffusion rate λ ≥ 0, there exists a steady-state in
which θ¯l = ρ¯l(k) = ρ¯l = 0 for either or both l ∈ {A,B}.
The existence of a steady-state in which nobody is informed is trivial. If the
initial conditions are such that no agent is informed of a meme, nobody ever
will be. Questions of interest concern the existence of a steady-state in which
ρ¯l > 0 for at least one l ∈ {A,B} and its characteristics. Henceforth, we will
denote, with slight abuse of notation, by ρ¯l(k) and ρ¯l the positive steady-state
values of meme prevalence, and by θ¯l the positive steady-state of θl for either
l ∈ {A,B}.
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3.3. Existence of Non-zero Steady-States
To analyze the existence of steady-states in which ρ¯l > 0 for either or both
l ∈ {A,B}, we adapt the following definition from Lo´pez-Pintado (2008).
Definition 1. For each l ∈ {A,B}, let λdl be such that the following two con-
ditions are satisfied:
(i) For all λ > λdl , there exists a positive steady-state for meme l, i.e., a
steady-state in which a strictly positive fraction of the population is in-
formed about it, while it does not exist for λ ≤ λdl .
(ii) For all λ > λdl , starting from an infinitesimally small fraction of agents
informed about l, the dynamics converge to a positive steady-state, while
for λ ≤ λdl , they converge to a steady-state in which no agent is informed
about l.
We call λdl the diffusion threshold of meme l.
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Furthermore, we are interested in how the diffusion threshold and the preva-
lence of either meme compare to the case in which meme l is the unique meme
diffusing on the network. We therefore define the following concepts.
Definition 2. Let λd be the diffusion threshold in case a unique meme diffuses
through the network.
Definition 3. Let ρ˜ denote the positive steady-state prevalence of a meme if it
is the unique meme that diffuses through the network, with corresponding θ˜ and
ρ˜(k).
For the present diffusion process, it has been established12 that λd = 〈k〉〈k2〉 .
We are now in a position to state our first set of results regarding the existence
and stability of positive steady-states for either meme l ∈ {A,B}.
11Lo´pez-Pintado (2008) in fact defines a critical threshold above which a positive steady-
state exists, and a diffusion threshold above which a positive steady-state is stable. In the
present setting, these two thresholds always coincide.
12See, e.g., Jackson (2008) or Lo´pez-Pintado (2008) and the references therein.
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Theorem 1. The existence and magnitude of a diffusion threshold λdl are as
follows:
(i) If gl ∈ (0, 1) for both l ∈ {A,B}, a diffusion threshold exists and is given
by λda = λ
d
b = λ
d = 〈k〉〈k2〉 .
(ii) If gl = 1 for either l ∈ {A,B}, a diffusion threshold exists and is given by
λdl = λ
d = 〈k〉〈k2〉 . For λ > λ
d
l , θ¯l = θ˜, ρ¯(k) = ρ˜(k), and ρ¯l = ρ˜. There does
not exist a diffusion threshold for the composite meme, −l.
Independent of the value of gl, for either l ∈ {A,B} there exists at most one
steady-state in which θ¯l > 0, and therefore ρ¯l > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Our result that λdl is identical to λ
d for all interior values of gl highlights
an enormous resilience of information. Any combination of network structure
P (k) and λ that is sufficient to make a unique meme endemic is also sufficient
to make multiple memes endemic, provided that any interest exists in the pop-
ulation. This is despite the fact that, as evidenced by equations (1) and (2),
each individual meme is transmitted at a strictly lower rate than ν, the rate in
the standard SIS model. This suggests that λdl should be larger than λ
d for
at least one l. Briefly, the intuition as to why this is not the case is that the
negative externality the two memes impose on each other is determined through
ρab(k), which approaches zero faster as λ approaches λ
d from above than either
ρa(k) or ρb(k).
It is noteworthy that the results of Theorem 1 are the exact opposite of
the results in Prakash et al. (2012). They focus on the case of competing
viruses which endow the host with immunity against each other. In such a
framework, only the more infectious virus survives in the population. While
such immunity seems a realistic feature for some viruses or product adoption,
it appears less intuitive for the diffusion of information. In comparison with
previously established results, Theorem 1 highlights that the exact nature of
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competition between the diffusing states is crucial in determining the likelihood
of their survival.
Theorem 1 provides a possible argument for why such vast amounts of dif-
ferent topics are being discussed both offline and on OSNs, such as Twitter.
Assume that λ > λd. Then any meme that is deemed the most interesting by
a positive fraction of the population will survive on this network, no matter
how much of a niche topic it might be. Note that survival of a meme does not
necessarily imply that a sizeable fraction of the population will be informed of
it. We now turn to the magnitude of meme prevalences.
4. Information Prevalence and Network Structure
4.1. Relative Information Prevalence
Theorem 1 shows that the predictions of our model are in line with the ob-
servation that many memes survive simultaneously in a population. The second
aspect of communication that has been highlighted is that memes’ prevalences
differ. Ultimately, the prevalence of information l is determined by θ¯l, which is
the steady-state rate at which l is talked about. In general, it is not possible
to explicitly solve for θ¯l. Nevertheless, there are a number of positive results
that can be derived regarding relative meme prevalence. In the remainder of the
paper we focus on the case in which λ > λd and θ¯l > 0 for both l ∈ {A,B}.13
We also restrict ourselves to consider only finite values of λ. We refer to meme
l as the “majority” meme if gl > 1/2.
Proposition 1. Consider a given degree distribution P , λ > λd and gl ∈ (0, 1).
Then, θ¯a =
ga
gb
θ¯b. That is, θ¯a ≥ θ¯b, ρ¯a(k) ≥ ρ¯b(k), and ρ¯a ≥ ρ¯b if and only if
ga ≥ gb. Inequalities are strict if ga > gb, and in the case of pl(k), if k is finite.
Proof. The relation between θ¯a and θ¯b is proven in Lemma 3 in Appendix A.
The ranking of steady-states follows directly from this relation and the fact that
13If we set θ¯l = 0 for either l ∈ {A,B}, the composite meme −l will uniquely diffuse on the
network and the results of Lo´pez-Pintado (2008) apply.
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ρ¯l(k) is strictly increasing in θ¯l, while ρ¯l is increasing in ρ¯l(k).
Proposition 1 is independent of the type of degree distribution P , and in-
dependent of the diffusion rate λ, or degree k.14 It shows that relative interest
uniquely determines which meme exhibits a higher prevalence in the long run,
independent of any parameters of the diffusion process, including the network
structure. A driving force behind this result is the fact that random interac-
tions imply that all agents become informed about meme l at a higher rate
than meme −l if and only if gl > g-l. We show in Section 6 that the importance
of relative exposure in prevalence rankings remains intact also in environments
where groups are less symmetric. Proposition 1 also shows that relative commu-
nication rates, which is what is observed in data such as Twitter, are determined
entirely through relative interest. This is not true for relative meme prevalences.
Proposition 2. For each l ∈ {A,B} and gl ∈ (0, 1), θ¯l, ρ¯l(k), and ρ¯l are
strictly increasing in λ. Furthermore, for ga > gb:
(i) ρ¯a(k)ρ¯b(k) and
ρ¯a
ρ¯b
are strictly decreasing in λ.
(ii) ρ¯a(k)ρ¯b(k) is strictly decreasing in k.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The fact that all steady-state measures (θ¯l, ρ¯l(k), and ρ¯l), are increasing
in λ is unsurprising, and in line with the one-meme model. The decrease in
prevalence ratios in both k and λ is driven by an increased importance of ρ¯ab(k)
in both memes’ prevalences. Through it, any increase in the diffusion rate λ
will increase the prevalence of the minority meme relatively more. We now turn
to investigate how changes in the degree distribution P affect relative meme
prevalence.
14Where we specify finite k for strict inequalities, it is due to the fact that an agent who
meets every other agent at t will become informed of both memes for sure.
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4.2. Stochastic Dominance and Relative Prevalence
To analyze the impact of the network structure, we focus on the effect of
a change in the degree distribution in the sense of first order stochastic dom-
inance.15 In particular, the degree distribution P ′ first order stochastically
dominates the distribution P if
∑Y
k=0 P
′(k) ≤∑Yk=0 P (k) for all Y with strict
inequality for some Y .
Proposition 3. Let P ′ and P˜ ′ first order stochastically dominate P and P˜
respectively. Let gl ∈ (0, 1) for both l ∈ {A,B} and λ > λd. Then,
(i) θ¯′l > θ¯l, ρ¯′l(k) > ρ¯l(k), and ρ¯
′
l > ρ¯l for each l ∈ {A,B}.
(ii)
ρ¯′a(k)
ρ¯′b(k)
< ρ¯a(k)ρ¯b(k) and
ρ¯′a
ρ¯′b
< ρ¯aρ¯b if and only if ga > gb.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Both Proposition 2 and 3 show that any form of improvements in the trans-
mission of information are relatively more important for memes that are, ex
ante, less likely to be transmitted. Compared to communication offline, OSNs
might be characterized by an increased λ or indeed a first order stochastic dom-
inant shift in P (allow agents to have more meetings). If so, our results predict
that increased online communication disproportionally benefits the prevalence
of minority memes.
4.3. Crowding Out of Information
The third aspect of information diffusion that is highlighted in the Twitter
data of Leskovec et al. (2009) is the fact that hashtags crowd each other out, a
fact that lies at the heart of the prospect of ”burying” news. This is a direct
15We focus on first order stochastic dominance as it appears a change that might naturally
occur with an increasing importance of online communication. Another change in the degree
distribution investigated by, e.g., Jackson and Rogers (2007b) would be a mean-preserving
spread. We omit this comparison here for two reasons. First, it seems a case less related to
the rise in OSN’s. Second, Jackson and Rogers (2007b) show that its impact depends on the
value of λ. As the value of λ above which a mean-preserving spread increases prevalence cannot
be explicitly solved for, our analysis cannot go beyond re-iterating the results of Jackson and
Rogers (2007b) for both memes individually.
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consequence of the fact that overall communication stays roughly constant, while
hashtags are retweeted at different rates.
In the context of our model, an intuitive measure of crowding out is the
difference between a meme’s prevalence without competition from another meme
and the one with it, i.e., ρ˜− ρ¯. Without solving explicitly for θ¯l, the exact level
of crowding out cannot be determined. We can, however, establish its existence,
and find boundaries on the relation between θ¯l and θ˜.
Proposition 4. For any P , λ > λd and gl ∈ (0, 1), crowding out is positive:
θ¯l ∈
(
glθ˜ ,
gl
1− glg-l θ˜
)
.
As θ˜ > θ¯l, it follows that ρ˜(k) > ρ¯l(k) and ρ˜ > ρ¯l.
Proof. See Appendix D.
While it is clear from the bounds on θ¯l that gl is a significant determinant in
crowding out, its exact value depends on the degree distribution and λ in non-
obvious ways. Its extent can neither be ranked according to FOSD of degree
distributions, nor according to λ for a given degree distribution. Nevertheless,
the derived bounds show that it can be extensive.
5. Segregation and Integration
5.1. Information Prevalence under Segregation
In the preceding analysis, agents of groups A and B interact randomly with
each other, irrespective of group membership. Currarini et al. (2009) show that
homophily patterns in the data appear to go beyond random interactions, a
concept they term inbreeding homophily.16
To incorporate homophily into our model, we denote by βl ∈ [0, 1] the prob-
ability that an agent belonging to group l will meet another agent from the
16One of the earliest work on homophily in general is Lazarsfeld et al. (1954). See also the
survey by McPherson et al. (2001).
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same group. This parameter captures the level of homophily of group l. When
βl = 1, all meetings are within the same group, and at βl = 0 all meetings are
with members of the opposite group. We recover random interactions by setting
βl = gl. Interactions are homophilous if βl > gl. To ensure that meetings across
groups are well defined, we require that
ga(1− βa) = gb(1− βb),
i.e., the fraction of the population that is of type A and meets type B agents is
the same as the fraction who is type B and meets type A.
By allowing βl 6= gl, we have to keep track of how the prevalence of meme l
evolves in group l. We denote the prevalence of meme l among degree-k agents
in group l by ρll(k), where subscript l denotes meme l and superscript denotes
group l. Overall prevalences ρll and the probability of a type l agent transmitting
meme l when communication takes place (θll) are defined analogously. Any
steady-state of the system now has to be a solution to the following equations:
ρaa(k) =
λkθaa
1 + λkθaa
, (11)
ρba(k) =
λkθba
1 + λkθba
, (12)
ρab(k) =
λkθab
1 + λkθab
, (13)
ρbb(k) =
λkθbb
1 + λkθbb
, (14)
with
θaa =
∑
k
P˜ (k) [βaρ
a
a(k) + (1− βa)ρba(k)[1− ρbb(k)]] , (15)
θba =
∑
k
P˜ (k) [βbρ
b
a(k)[1− ρbb(k)] + (1− βb)ρaa(k)] , (16)
θab =
∑
k
P˜ (k) [βaρ
a
b(k)[1− ρaa(k)] + (1− βa)ρbb(k)] , (17)
θbb =
∑
k
P˜ (k) [βbρ
b
b(k) + (1− βb)ρab(k)[1− ρaa(k)]] . (18)
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Note that by setting βl = gl, we recover our original model. Furthermore, it
is apparent that βl only matters for prevalence as long as both memes diffuse
simultaneously. By setting, e.g., θab = θ
b
b = 0, we see that θ
a
a = θ
b
a = θ˜ is a
steady-state of the system for any value of βl. Similarly, there always exists a
steady-state in which the prevalence of both memes is zero. Without restricting
either βl further, we are able to derive the following result.
Lemma 1. Let ga ≥ gb and the degree of homophily be given by βl ∈ [0, 1]. For
all λ ≤ 〈k〉〈k2〉 the steady-state in which no agent is informed about either meme l
is asymptotically stable. It is unstable for all λ > 〈k〉〈k2〉 .
Proof. See Appendix E.
While Lemma 1 stops short of proving the existence or the stability of one (or
more) positive steady-state(s) for the system, it does establish that information
survival itself is independent of the level of homophily whenever some degree of
interaction takes place between groups. If β = 1 the population is split into two
separate groups, each of which homogeneously prefers one meme. Theorem 1 has
established the diffusion threshold in this scenario, and it follows in particular
that under full segregation, in each group only the preferred meme will survive.
The implications of segregation are thus stark: Independent of the amount of
initial media coverage (i.e., the “seed” of meme l), the degree distribution P , or
the diffusion rate λ, meme B will never exhibit a positive steady-state in group
A and vice versa. Our next Theorem establishes that this result is specific to
the case of full segregation.
Theorem 2. Let λ > λd and ga ≥ gb. For any degree of homophily such that
βl ∈ [0, 1) for both l ∈ {0, 1}, it is the case that if meme l exhibits a positive
prevalence in group l, it also exhibits a positive prevalence in group −l.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Theorem 2 mirrors qualitatively the main result of Theorem 1. As long as
some interaction between groups occurs, information will survive either in both
groups, or in neither.
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The corner case of full segregation can be employed for further analysis.
It serves as a useful benchmark against which to compare the case of random
interacions. In what follows, we refer to a segregated society as one in which
βa = βb = 1, and to an integrated society as one in which βl = gl. Our next
result establishes that the prevalence of either meme is lower in a segregated
society than in an integrated one.
Theorem 3. For gl ∈ (0, 1) and λ > λd, the prevalence of meme l is ρ¯l in an
integrated society and it is glρ˜ in a segregated society. The following holds:
(i) ρ¯l > glρ˜l; information prevalence is higher in an integrated society. The
information loss due to segregation is larger for meme A than meme B if
and only if ga > gb.
(ii) glρ¯l < glρ˜; the proportion of the population informed about their preferred
meme is higher in a segregated society.
Proof. The second point is immediate as ρ˜ > ρ¯l. The inequality and ranking of
information loss established in the first point are derived in Appendix G.
To the best of our knowledge, the result that segregation can lead to a de-
crease in total prevalence is novel in the literature. It goes beyond the polarizing
impact of having no agent informed about both A and B in the long run. In-
deed, if memes A and B are entirely unrelated, there might not be perceivable
benefits of being informed about both simultaneously. Nevertheless, even if seg-
regation does not lead to polarization, it has an impact on information. This
impact falls disproportionally on the prevalence of the majority meme, thus
segregation reduces particularly the steady-state prevalence of information that
might be considered mainstream.
The distinction between overall meme prevalence and meme prevalence within
each group is also noteworthy. If, e.g., A is a piece of celebrity gossip and B a
piece of political news, the value that agents in group A put on being informed
about B (and vice versa) might be limited. That is, while overall information
is lost due to segregation, it increases prevalence of memes among those that
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attach a higher value to it. This leads us to question under which conditions
agents themselves prefer a segregated society to an integrated one, which we
address now.
5.2. Welfare under Segregation and Integration
While segregation reduces information prevalence and leads to polarization,
the model so far is too general to allow for a concrete welfare analysis. To
this end, we impose additional structure on the utility agents gain from being
informed. To keep the analysis as tractable as possible, we assume that agents
derive utility directly from being informed about memes A and/or B. We
assume that an agent in group l receives a flow utility of h while he is informed
about meme l and a flow utility of s while he is informed about meme −l, where
h ≥ s ≥ 0. Such utility flows could arise if agents truly value information in
itself, but also if they value it because there is the possibility that it will be
useful at an uncertain, future, date.17 Agents then care about ρ¯l(k), which is
the time that an agent of degree k spends being informed about l in steady-
state. We also assume that agents care only about the steady-state values of
ρ¯l(k) and ρ¯-l(k). As the case of zero prevalences is uninformative, we focus again
on the case where λ > λd. The utility of an agent with degree k in group l in
an integrated and a segregated society is then
U(k)l|int = hρ¯l(k) + sρ¯-l(k), and (19)
U(k)l|seg = hρ˜(k). (20)
Following these utilities and the results of Theorem 3, it is immediate that
in a society in which all agents place positive utility only on one meme, i.e.,
17It is, e.g., possible that agents might value to be informed not so much because it pro-
vides them with any benefit in itself, but because there is a chance that these topics might be
discussed in their presence, and not being informed would brand them as ignorant. Alterna-
tively, the information might pertain to the state of the world and an agent knows that at an
uncertain point in the (distant) future he will have to take an action whose payoff depends on
the state. In either case, the expected utility of an agent would be increasing in the amount
of time he is informed, which is captured with our parsimonious utility function.
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h > 0 and s = 0, all agents are better off in a segregated society. Conversely, if
both memes are valued equally by all agents, h = s > 0, all agents are strictly
better off in an integrated society. For all other values of h and s, an agent of
group l and degree k is strictly better off in a segregated society if and only if
s
h
<
ρ˜(k)− ρ¯l(k)
ρ¯-l(k)
. (21)
This formalizes the intuitive idea that segregation is more likely to be ben-
eficial to agents who have more extreme preferences for the two memes. The
smaller the ratio sh , the more likely it is that an agent with degree k and of
group l will prefer a segregated society to an integrated one. The exact value of
s
h at which agents are indifferent between segregation and integration depends
on the values of k, gl, λ, and P . Let ml(k) ≡ ρ˜(k)−ρ¯l(k)ρ¯-l(k) . The larger ml(k),
the broader is the range of sh for which an agent prefers a segregated society.
The effects of λ and P on ml(k) are interrelated and no general statements can
be made about them.18 However, we are able to state the following positive
results.
Theorem 4. For all λ > λd,
• ml(k) is decreasing in k for each l ∈ {A,B}. The higher an agents’ degree,
the broader is the range of sh for which he prefers an integrated society.
• ma(k) < mb(k) if and only if ga > gb. Conditional on degree, an agent
that belongs to the minority group prefers an integrated society for a smaller
range of sh .
Proof. See Appendix H.
Theorem 4 shows that for a fixed value of sh , segregation is always more
likely to be preferred by members of the minority group, and/or by agents that
18Although it is noteworthy that there is a general tendency for λ to decrease ml(k), i.e., a
tendency for increases in information transmission to increase agents’ welfare of integration,
relative to segregation.
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have fewer meetings per period. With the exception of a regular network, in
which all agents have the same degree, segregation must not be unanimously
preferred by all members of a group. Furthermore, unless ga = gb, it is possible
for agents of one group (the minority group) to prefer segregation while similar
agents of the majority group prefer an integrated society.
5.3. Endogenous Segregation
We now turn to the question of the emergence of a segregated or integrated
society. In particular, we ask under which conditions either type of society is
a (strict) Nash equilibrium, if agents can choose whether to interact randomly
across types, or to restrict their interactions to members of their own group.19
In a society in which all interactions are governed by random interactions,
an agent of group l and degree k obtains a utility given by equation (19). If he
deviates and interacts only with members of his own group, this deviation will
have no impact on overall meme prevalence. By deviating, the agent becomes
informed of meme l at rate θˆl =
∑
k P˜ (k)ρ¯l(k) at a meeting, and of meme −l
at rate θˆ-l =
∑
k P˜ (k)ρ¯-l(k)[1 − ρ¯l(k)] (both conditional on communicating).20
Therefore, his prevalence of meme l will be ρˆl(k) =
kλθˆl
1+kλθˆl
and that of meme
−l will be ρˆ-l(k) = kλθˆ-l1+kλθˆ-l . This implies that random interactions are a strict
(and stable) Nash equilibrium if for both l and all k
hρˆl(k) + sρˆ-l(k) < hρl(k) + sρ-l(k) ⇒
s
h
>
ρˆl(k)− ρl(k)
ρ-l(k)− ρˆ-l(k) ≡ nl(k). (22)
If, on the other hand, sh < nl(k) for at least some k, random interactions are
not an equilibrium.
19Given the lack of positive results for more general levels of homophily, we restrict the
action set of agents to a choice between full integration and full segregation. While this
is obviously restrictive, our results provide useful insights into whenever either interaction
pattern is not an equilibrium, which translate to richer action sets.
20As the agent only meets members of group l, everybody who is informed of l will pass
this on, while only those who are only aware of −l will pass meme −l on.
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In contrast, the utility an agent receives in a fully segregated society is given
by (20). If he deviates from this pattern and interacts randomly, he will meet
another member of group l at rate gl, and a member of group −l at rate g-l. In
the first case, conditional on communication, he will become informed of meme
l at rate θ˜ and will never hear meme −l. In the second, he will only ever be
told of meme −l, again at rate θ˜. Which implies that his prevalences when
interacting randomly with others will be ρˇl(k) =
glkλθ˜
1+glkλθ˜
and ρˇ-l(k) =
g-lkλθ˜
1+g-lkλθ˜
respectively. Segregation is a strict (and stable) Nash equilibrium if for all k in
at least one group
hρ˜(k) > hρˇl(k) + sρˇ-l(k) ⇒
s
h
<
1 + g-lkλθ˜
(1 + kλθ˜)(1 + glkλθ˜)
≡ ηl(k). (23)
These results allow us various insights into the occurence of either an inte-
grated or a segregated society.
Proposition 5. For all λ > λd,
• na(k) < nb(k) and ηa < ηb if ga > gb, i.e., ceteris paribus, segregation is
more likely to be Nach equilibrium if group sizes are heterogenous.
• for both l, ηl(k) is strictly decreasing in k, λ, and a FOSD shift of the
degree distribution.
• if segregation is preferred to integration, i.e., sh < ml(k), for at least some
k of either l, integration is not a Nash equilibrium. If sh < ml(k) holds for
all members of either l, a segregated society is a stable Nash equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix I. The ranking of ηl(k) is immediate from equation (23).
Lemmas 6 and 7, which are employed in the proof, establish that for any
(finite) k, l, and λ, both nl(k) > ml(k) and ηl(k) > ml(k). Thus, whenever
a segregated society is preferred by all members of either group, segregation is
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the unique Nash equilibrium. The converse does not hold. If ml(k) <
s
h <
min{nl(k), ηl(k)} for all agents, an integrated society provides higher welfare
to all, yet segregation remains the only Nash equilibrium.21 It is similarly
interesting that segregation is more likely to be the unique Nash equilibrium if
group sizes are heterogeneous. In this sense, we expect segregation to be driven
by the minority group.
Insofar as OSNs might create a possibility to segregate where previously
none existed, our results of Section 5.1 indicate that increased popularity of
these networks has the potential to polarize a society and reduce information
prevalence. Section 5.2 establishes that segregation is more likely to be beneficial
to agents that are (i) particularly interested in niche or very specialized pieces of
information (small gl), (ii) are extreme in their valuation of information (small
s
h ), and/or (iii) are comparatively “anti-social”, in the sense that they have
few meetings per period (small k). The results of the present Section show
that preferences for segregation can be linked to the endogenous emergence of
a segregated society. In particular, a segregated society is also more likely to
emerge if sh is small, and it is the unique Nash equilibrium if it is preferred by
all members of the minority group.
On the other hand, OSNs might do more than simply offer a possibility to
segregate. They might facilitate communication or interactions, i.e., increase
either λ, k, or lead to a FOSD shift in the distribution of meetings. Either
increase makes segregation less likely as an equilibrium as it decreases ηl(k).
Note that our results pertaining to either integration or segregation not being an
equilibrium are valid even if we allow for a richer action set of agents, including
more general levels of homophily.22
21A conflict between stability and efficiency in network formation has been shown to arise
in a variety of settings, see e.g., Jackson (2005) for an excellent overview. Masson et al.
(2018) is another recent example, albeit in a different setting. Izquierdo et al. (2018) have
found that homophily might be inefficiently high, reminiscent of our result regarding inefficient
segregation.
22In fact, for the case of equal group sizes and considering all potential levels of homophily,
we can show that random interactions are a Nash equilibrium if and only if s = h for all
agents. Thus, it seems likely that we should observe some form of biased interaction patterns.
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6. Extensions
6.1. Degree Distributions Depending on Type
The benchmark model assumes that types are identical except for their in-
formation preferences. In the present Section, we relax this assumption and
allow the two types to differ with respect to their degree distributions, such
that Pa(k) 6= Pb(k). We keep the assumptions that each meme is being com-
municated at rate ν and that only the preferred meme will be communicated
by an agent aware of both memes.
With different degree distributions across types, we define gˆl =
gl〈k〉l
〈k〉 where
〈k〉 is the average degree in the whole network and 〈k〉l the average degree in
group l. Thus, gˆl describes the likelihood that an agent of type l is being met
at a meeting. A steady-state is determined by a fixed point of the system:
HA(θa, θb) = gˆa
∑
k
P˜a(k)
λkθa
(1 + λkθa)
+ gˆb
∑
k
P˜b(k)
λkθa
(1 + λkθa)(1 + λkθb)
, (24)
HB(θa, θb) = gˆa
∑
k
P˜a(k)
λkθa
(1 + λkθa)(1 + λkθb)
+ gˆb
∑
k
P˜b(k)
λkθb
(1 + λkθb)
. (25)
This allows us the following result.
Proposition 6. The steady-state in which θ¯l = 0 for both l ∈ {A,B} is asymp-
totically stable if and only if λ ≤ 〈k〉ga〈k2〉a+gb〈k2〉b . For a steady-state to exist in
which θ¯a > 0 and θ¯b > 0, it is necessary that gl ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. The proof of Proposition 6 follows the steps outlined in Appendix A.
Proposition 6 highlights that our earlier results on the severe impact of segre-
gation on information survival are robust to asymmetries in degree distributions.
Similarly, the condition for asymptotic stability of the zero steady-state appears
an intuitive generalization of our earlier results. Finally, we are able to show
The relevant derivations are available on request.
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that it is no longer true that the meme preferred by the majority group will
automatically exhibit a larger prevalence. Instead, in the present generalization
the ratio θ¯a/θ¯b depends on the three factors that influence the likelihood that
an agent will be told meme l, namely group size, average degree per group, and
the relative degree distributions.23
6.2. Information Transmission to Please Neighbors
Within our model, strategic information transmission to influence other
agents’ beliefs or actions is not likely. Each agent knows that they are too
small to affect the overall prevalences of memes, and he is not affected by any
decision his neighbors take based on the information he passes on. It is more
likely that information transmission might be tailored to increase the utility
of neighbors, i.e., it is conceivable that an agent who is aware of both memes
passes on the preferred meme of his neighbor rather than his own. Under the
assumption that types are common knowledge and an agent can send a differ-
ent message to each of his neighbors, this change in assumption renders the
model intractable. If types are unobserved, however, the present analysis con-
tinues to hold. In that case, an agent puts probability gl (or βl, in the case
of homophily) that his neighbor is of type l, and the present model remains
unchanged. Unobserved types might describe the reality of chat rooms where
agents can form reasonable estimates of the likelihood that they will meet their
own types, but not necessarily observe these directly. Similarly, the analysis
would remain unchanged if an agent had to communicate the same meme to all
his neighbors (like a tweet) and would choose the frequency with which to send
meme l according to the composition of types in the neighborhood.
23The exact relationship is
θ¯a =
ga
gb
θ¯b ·
〈k〉a
∑
k P˜a(k)
(λk)2
(1+λkθ¯a)(1+λkθ¯b)
〈k〉b
∑
k P˜b(k)
(λk)2
(1+λkθ¯a)(1+λkθ¯b)
.
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7. Conclusion
The present paper introduces communication constraints into a standard
SIS diffusion model: While two memes diffuse simultaneously on the network,
at each meeting an agent can pass on at most one of these. The choice of
which meme to pass on is driven by intrinsic preferences, and agents can be
grouped according to which meme they prefer. In essence, the existence of
communication constraints introduces opportunity costs in the diffusion process.
To the best of our knowledge, communication costs of any type have not before
been analyzed in a SIS framework.
We find that our parsimonious model is in line with stylized communication
patterns found in Twitter data, such as differences in prevalences and crowd-
ing out of memes. Most importantly, our model predicts that information is
resilient, in the sense that the conditions under which a unique meme exhibits
a positive steady-state are identical to the conditions under which both memes
exhibit positive steady-states. Thus, it is able to provide one possible rational-
ization for why so many different topics are discussed simultaneously online.
When we allow for segregated interactions among agents, we find that segre-
gation leads to polarization, a loss of information overall, but an increase in the
fraction of agents informed of their preferred meme. We extend our model by
introducing explicit utility flows from being informed, which allows us to inves-
tigate the factors that drive segregation. We find that extremism of information
preferences and low number of meetings increase the likelihood of segregation.
The larger the size of the group that prefers a meme, the smaller are the in-
centives for agents of this group to segregate. In fact, we find that segregation
is more likely (and integration less likely) to be a Nash equilibrium the more
dispersed the group sizes are in the population.
We believe that our results relating to the impact (and the causes) of seg-
regation are of particular interest when applied to the rise of Online Social
Networks. Much information that diffuses on these is casual chit-chat, which
we think is well captured by our model. Our results imply that for otherwise
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identical memes (with respect to, e.g., ν and δ) only the preferred meme will
survive in a segregated group and there is an overall loss of information, both
potential costs of segregation.
Our model is kept deliberately simple to highlight the impact of opportunity
costs in the diffusion of information. There are a number of extensions that we
believe would be promising areas of future research. One of these would be to
consider the incentives of players exogenous to the network that provide the
initial information ”seed” of each meme. The uniqueness and stability of meme
prevalences in the present model imply that there is no scope for strategic in-
formation seeding. Related to this is the question of how agents choose which
information to communicate. In our model, memes are unrelated to each other
and each agent is too insignificant to affect the steady-state prevalence of either
meme. As such, linking the communication choice to intrinsic preferences ap-
pears a valid approximation of the choice process. However, if either of these
conditions did not hold, strategic considerations will play a role in the transmis-
sion process. Alternatively, forgetting is a complex matter, and might depend
on preferences, or the number of memes an agent has been exposed to. We
believe that these are interesting aspects of the diffusion process that deserve
closer attention.
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
Generically, the potential steady-states of memes A and B can be of three
types: (i) a steady-state in which neither meme exhibits a positive prevalence,
(ii) a steady-state in which θ¯l > 0 for either l = A or l = B, and zero for
the other meme, and (iii) a steady-state in which θ¯l > 0 for both l ∈ {A,B}.
As highlighted in Remark 1, the case in which neither meme exhibits a positive
prevalence trivially always exists. Based on this, the second type of steady-state
also always exists. It is trivial to show that when setting θl = 0 for either l, the
model collapses to the one-meme model. Existence and magnitude of λdl for the
composite meme then follow immediately from the arguments in Lo´pez-Pintado
(2008). So does the fact that at most one steady-state exists in which ρ¯l(k) > 0.
We therefore focus on proving the existence and magnitude of λdl for the case
where θl > 0 for both l. To do so, we employ four lemmas. Due to the symmetry
of memes A and B, we can change the labels of the information to apply any
arguments that we make about A also for B. For expositional simplicity, we
will therefore focus on meme A in these lemmas, without loss of generality.
In steady-state, both equation (1) and (2) must be satisfied. Under the
condition that θl > 0 for both l, these can be re-arranged to show that at any
positive steady-state, if one exists, the following equations must be satisfied,
1 =
∑
k
P˜ (k)
kλ(
1 + kλθ¯a
) (
1 + kλθ¯b
) (1 + gakλθ¯b), (A.1)
1 =
∑
k
P˜ (k)
kλ(
1 + kλθ¯a
) (
1 + kλθ¯b
) (1 + gbkλθ¯a). (A.2)
First, Lemma 2 proves the the existence and magnitude of λdl for gl = 1,
and that at most one steady-state exists in which θ¯ > 0.
Lemma 2. The arguments in Lo´pez-Pintado (2008) are sufficient to show that
for gl = 1, θ¯l = θ˜ > 0 exists if and only if λ >
〈k〉
〈k2〉 , that there exists only one
steady-state in which θ¯l > 0, and that this state is stable. For gl = 0 there exists
no diffusion threshold.
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Proof. It is immediate that if ga = 1, the steady-state condition for θ¯a in equa-
tion (A.1) is identical to the condition when A is the only information on the
network. Lo´pez-Pintado (2008) has proven existence and stability of a positive
steady-state in this case, as well as the fact that at most one positive steady-
state exists.
It is easy to see that if ga = 1 and gb = 0, there is no θ¯b > 0 that solves
equation (A.2) and (A.1) simultaneously, independently of the value of λ. Con-
sequently, for gl = 0 there exists no diffusion threshold.
The following Lemma is a useful step in the derivation of steady-states when
gl ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 3. For gl ∈ (0, 1), any steady-state such that θ¯l > 0 for both l has the
property that
θ¯a =
ga
gb
θ¯b. (A.3)
Proof. Equations (A.1) and (A.2) show that for any ga ∈ (0, 1) any steady-state
has the property stated in equation (A.3), as this is the only condition under
which both (A.1)and (A.2) hold simultaneously.
Lemma 4. For gl ∈ (0, 1), a steady-state in which θ¯l > 0 exists if and only if
λ > 〈k〉〈k2〉 . There exists at most one steady-state in which θ¯l > 0.
Proof. To prove Lemma 4, note that by Lemma 3, we can state that any poten-
tial pair of steady-states for θa and θb, which we denote θ´a and θ´b respectively,
has the property that θ´a = ga/gbθ´b. We can employ this relationship to write
the steady-state condition for θa as a function of θ´a.
HA(θ´a) =
∑
k
P˜ (k)
kλθ´a
1 + kλθ´a
1 + gbkλθ´a
1 + gbga kλθ´a
. (A.4)
Fixed points such that HA(θ´a) = θ´a correspond to the steady-state θ¯a that is
consistent with θ¯b. We follow the arguments put forward in Jackson and Rogers
(2007b) and Lo´pez-Pintado (2008) to show the existence of a fixed point in
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which θ¯a > 0, and that at most one such point exists. First, note that
HA(0) = 0, (A.5)
HA(1) =
∑
k
P˜ (k)
kλ
1 + kλ
1 + gbkλ
1 + gbga kλ
< 1. (A.6)
The second result is immediate since
∑
k P˜ (k) = 1, and both factors that mul-
tiply P˜ (k) in HA(1) are less than 1 (strictly so if ga ∈ (0, 1)). Furthermore,
taking first and second order derivatives of HA(θ´a) with respect to θ´a yields
HA
′
(θ´a) =
∑
k
P˜ (k)
kλ
[
1 + 2gbkλθ´a
]
(1 + kλθ´a)2(1 +
gb
ga
kλθ´a)2
> 0, (A.7)
HA
′′
(θ´a) =
∑
k
P˜ (k)
{
− 2k
2λ2(1 + 2gbkλθ´a)
(1 + kλθ´a)3(1 +
gb
ga
kλθ´a)2
+ (A.8)
+
2k2λ2
[
gb − gbga −
g2b
ga
kλθ´a
]
(1 + kλθ´a)2(1 +
gb
ga
kλθ´a)3
 < 0,
i.e., HA(θ´a) is strictly increasing and concave in θ´a. This implies that θ¯a > 0
exists if HA
′
(0) > 1, and that in this case, only one such positive point exists.
In fact,
HA
′
(0) =
∑
k
P˜ (k)kλ =
∑
k
P (k)k2λ
〈k〉 = λ
〈k2〉
〈k〉 (A.9)
which is larger than 1 if and only if λ > 〈k〉〈k2〉 , identical to the one-meme case.
This completes the proof of existence of a possible positive steady-state θ¯l > 0
for l ∈ {A,B}, and that at most one θ¯l > 0 exists.
In the one-meme case, concavity of H(θ) implies stability of the single posi-
tive steady-state as well as its existence. But since HA(θ´a) is derived under the
condition that θ´a =
ga
gb
θ´b, convergence to the steady-state does not follow from
the above arguments. Instead, Lemma 5 is employed.
Lemma 5. Whenever θ¯l > 0 exists, it is asymptotically stable.
Proof. We conduct the stability analysis through the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
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of the system
HA(θa, θb)− θa = 0, (A.10)
HB(θa, θb)− θb = 0. (A.11)
The entries of the Jacobian are,
∂HA
∂θa
− 1 =
∑
k
P˜ (k)
kλ
(1 + kλθa)2
[
1− gb kλθb
1 + kλθb
]
− 1, (A.12)
∂HA
∂θb
= −gb
∑
k
P˜ (k)
k2λ2θa
(1 + kλθa)(1 + kλθb)2
, (A.13)
∂HB
∂θa
= −ga
∑
k
P˜ (k)
k2λ2θb
(1 + kλθa)2(1 + kλθb)
, (A.14)
∂HB
∂θb
− 1 =
∑
k
P˜ (k)
kλ
(1 + kλθb)2
[
1− ga kλθa
1 + kλθa
]
− 1. (A.15)
At θ¯a = θ¯b = 0, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian are
∂HA
∂θa
− 1 and ∂HB∂θb − 1,
both of which are equal to
∑
k P˜ (k)kλ− 1. I.e., the zero steady-state is stable
if λ < 〈k〉〈k2〉 and unstable if λ >
〈k〉
〈k2〉 .
At θ¯a > 0, θ¯b = 0, again the eigenvalues are
∂HA
∂θa
− 1 and ∂HB∂θb − 1. In this
case,
∂HA
∂θa
− 1 =
∑
k
P˜ (k)
kλ
(1 + kλθ¯a)2
− 1 < 0, (A.16)
∂HB
∂θb
− 1 =
∑
k
P˜ (k)
[
kλ
1 + kλθ¯a
+ gb
k2λ2θ¯a
1 + kλθ¯a
]
− 1 > 0. (A.17)
Since at θ¯a > 0, θ¯b = 0, it is the case that
∑
k P˜ (k)
kλ
1+kλθ¯a
= 1. I.e., this
steady-state is unstable, too. Symmetry implies that the same argument applies
for θ¯a = 0, θ¯b > 0.
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Finally, for θ¯a > 0, θ¯b > 0, the two eigenvalues of the Jacobian are
r1,2 =
1
2
{
∂HA
∂θa
+
∂HB
∂θb
− 2±[(
∂HA
∂θa
+
∂HB
∂θb
− 2
)2
− 4
(
(
∂HA
∂θa
− 1)(∂H
B
∂θb
− 1)− ∂H
A
∂θb
∂HB
∂θa
)]1/2 .
Note that ∂H
A
∂θa
< H
A
θa
and ∂H
B
∂θb
< H
B
θb
. Since at the steady-state, H
l
θ¯l
= 1,
this automatically implies that ∂H
A
∂θa
− 1 < 0 and ∂HB∂θb − 1 < 0 at the steady-
state. Thus, for both eigenvalues to be negative, it is sufficient that (∂H
A
∂θa
−
1)(∂H
B
∂θb
− 1) − ∂HA∂θb ∂H
B
∂θa
> 0. For this to hold, in turn, it is sufficient that
1 − ∂HA∂θa > −∂H
B
∂θa
and 1 − ∂HB∂θb > −∂H
A
∂θb
. Given the partial derivatives, the
condition that 1− ∂HA∂θa > −∂H
B
∂θa
is equal to
1−
∑
k
P˜ (k)
[
kλ(
1 + kλθ¯a
)2 + (gb − ga) k2λ2θ¯b(
1 + kλθ¯a
)2 (
1 + kλθ¯b
)] > 0. (A.18)
We know that at (θ¯a, θ¯b),
1 =
∑
k
P˜ (k)
[
kλ
1 + kλθ¯a
− gb k
2λ2θ¯b(
1 + kλθ¯a
) (
1 + kλθ¯b
)] . (A.19)
By substituting this expression into equation (A.18), all terms are sums over k.
For equation (A.18) to be satisfied, it is then sufficient that it is satisfied for all
individual terms of the sums, i.e.,
kλ
1 + kλθ¯a
− gb k
2λ2θ¯b(
1 + kλθ¯a
) (
1 + kλθ¯b
) − kλ(
1 + kλθ¯a
)2 + (A.20)
+(gb − ga) k
2λ2θ¯b(
1 + kλθ¯a
)2 (
1 + kλθ¯b
) > 0.
Simplifying equation (A.20), we find that it is equivalent to the condition that
1 + kλθ¯b > 0, (A.21)
which is always satisfied. Yet again due to symmetry, this also shows that
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1− ∂HB∂θb > −∂H
A
∂θb
, too. This completes the proof that for λ > 〈k〉〈k2〉 , the uniquely
stable steady-state is the one in which θ¯l > 0 for both l ∈ {A,B}.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2
To prove the first part of Proposition 2, note that ρ¯l is increasing in λ if
and only if ρ¯l(k) is increasing in λ. For ρ¯l(k) to be increasing in λ in turn it is
sufficient that θ¯l is increasing in λ. We prove this now for l = A. As
HA(θ´a) =
∑
k
P˜ (k)
kλθ´a
1 + kλθ´a
1 + gbkλθ´a
1 + gbga kλθ´a
,
it follows that for given θ´a,
∂HA(θ´a)
∂λ
=
kθ´a
(1 + kλθ´a)2(1 +
gb
ga
kλθ´a)2
[
1 + 2gbkλθ´a
]
> 0. (B.1)
Fix λ and λ′ and let θ¯a = HA(θ¯a) for λ and θ¯A′ = HA
′
(θ¯A′) for λ
′. Propo-
sition 2 states that for any λ′ > λ, θ¯A′ > θ¯a.
Suppose to the contrary that θ¯A′ ≤ θ¯a. Then, as HA(θ´a) is concave in θ´a, it
is the case that θ¯A′ ≤ HA(θ¯A′). However, from equation (B.1) we know that
HA(θ¯A′) < H
A′(θ¯A′) (B.2)
which contradicts the fact that θ¯A′ = H
A′(θ¯A′). Thus, for each λ
′ > λ, θ¯A′ > θ¯a.
Hence, θ¯a is increasing in λ. The same argument holds for l = B.
To show that ρ¯aρ¯b is decreasing in λ if and only if ga > gb, it suffices to show
that ρ¯a(k)ρ¯b(k) is decreasing in λ if and only if ga > gb. If this is true, ρ¯b(k) is
increasing in λ faster than ρ¯a(k), which implies that also ρ¯b is increasing in λ
faster than ρ¯a. To this end, it is useful to employ the result that θ¯a =
νa
νb
θ¯b,
which allows us to write ρ¯a(k)ρ¯b(k) as
ρ¯a(k)
ρ¯b(k)
=
ga
gb
+ kλθ¯a
1 + kλθ¯a
. (B.3)
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This implies that
d ρ¯a(k)ρ¯b(k)
dλ
=
k[θ¯a + λ
dθ¯a
dλ ]
(1 + kλθ¯a)2
(
1− ga
gb
)
. (B.4)
Which, as θ¯a is strictly increasing in λ, is negative if and only if ga > gb. Finally,
it is straightforward to show that
d ρ¯a(k)ρ¯b(k)
dk
=
λθ¯a
(1 + kλθ¯a)2
(
1− ga
gb
)
(B.5)
which again is negative if and only if ga > gb, which completes the proof.
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 3
For a single meme, Theorem 1 in Jackson and Rogers (2007b) proves that
the steady-states of θ, ρ(k), and ρ are increasing in a first order stochastic shift
in P and P˜ as H(θ) is concave and H(1) < 1. In the present model, Lemma
4 proves concavity for H l(θ¯l). The proof of the first point hence follows from
Theorem 1 in Jackson and Rogers (2007b).
To prove the second point, it is useful to again write
ρ¯a(k)
ρ¯b(k)
=
ga
gb
+ kλθ¯a
1 + kλθ¯a
.
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to θ¯a yields
d ρ¯a(k)ρ¯b(k)
dθ¯a
=
k[θ¯a + λ
dθ¯a
dλ ]
(1 + kλθ¯a)2
(
1− ga
gb
)
(C.1)
which is decreasing in θ¯a if and only if ga > gb. As this implies that ρ¯b(k) is
increasing in θ¯a faster than ρ¯a(k) if and only if ga > gb, it also implies that ρ¯b is
increasing in θ¯a faster than ρ¯a if and only if ga > gb. As a first order stochastic
dominant change in the degree distribution implies an increase in θ¯a, the second
point follows.
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Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 4
We focus on l = A with ga > gb > 0. Information prevalence in the one-
meme case is given by
ρ˜ =
∑
k
P (k)ρ˜(k), (D.1)
ρ˜(k) =
kλθ˜
1 + kλθ˜
(D.2)
θ˜ = H(θ˜) =
∑
k
P˜ (k)
kλθ˜
1 + kλθ˜
(D.3)
Therefore, ρ˜ is strictly increasing in ρ˜(k). Also,
ρ¯a(k) =
kλθ¯a
1 + kλθ¯a
,
which implies that ρ˜ > ρ¯a if and only if θ˜ > θ¯a.
To establish the bounds on θ¯a, we make use of the fact that at θ˜ > 0 and
θ¯a > 0, the following conditions are satisfied,
1 =
∑
k
P˜ (k)
kλ
1 + kλθ˜
, (D.4)
1 =
∑
k
P˜ (k)
kλ
1 + kλθ¯a
[
1− gb kλθ¯b
1 + kλθ¯b
]
. (D.5)
Which means that the two sums are equal to each other, and we can write them
as ∑
k
P˜ (k)
{
kλ
1 + kλθ˜
− kλ
1 + kλθ¯a
[
1− gb kλθ¯b
1 + kλθ¯b
]}
= 0. (D.6)
Some re-arranging shows that this implies
∑
k
P˜ (k)
k2λ2
(1 + kλθ˜)(1 + kλθ¯a)(1 + kλθ¯b)
· (D.7)
·
{
1
ga
[
θ¯a(ga + g
2
b)− gaθ˜
]
+ kλθ¯b(θ¯a − gaθ˜)
}
= 0.
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If θ¯a < gaθ˜, then θ¯a(ga + g
2
b) < gaθ˜ too, as ga + g
2
b < 1. I.e., each individual
term in the sum in equation (D.7) would be negative, which contradicts the
assumption that both θ¯a and θ˜ are steady-states. Similarly, if θ¯a >
ga
1−gagb θ˜, then
both terms in the sum in equation (D.7) would be positive, again contradicting
the steady-state assumption. Due to symmetry, the result for θ¯b follows, as do
the bounds stated in Proposition 4.
Appendix E. Proof of Lemma 1
Existence of a steady-state in which θ¯aa = θ¯
b
a = θ¯
a
b = θ¯
b
b = 0 for the general
system is trivial. The corresponding Jacobian evaluated at the zero steady-state
is
J =

βaλ
〈k2〉
〈k〉 − 1 (1− βa)λ 〈k
2〉
〈k〉 0 0
(1− βb)λ 〈k
2〉
〈k〉 βbλ
〈k2〉
〈k〉 − 1 0 0
0 0 βaλ
〈k2〉
〈k〉 − 1 (1− βa)λ 〈k
2〉
〈k〉
0 0 (1− βb)λ 〈k
2〉
〈k〉 βbλ
〈k2〉
〈k〉 − 1
 (E.1)
Thus,
|J− rI| =[(
βaλ
〈k2〉
〈k〉 − 1− r
)(
βbλ
〈k2〉
〈k〉 − 1− r
)
− λ2(1− βa)(1− βb)
[ 〈k2〉
〈k〉
]2]2
. (E.2)
It follows that |J− rI| = 0 if r solves
(
βaλ
〈k2〉
〈k〉 − 1− r
)(
βbλ
〈k2〉
〈k〉 − 1− r
)
= λ2(1− βa)(1− βb)
[ 〈k2〉
〈k〉
]2
⇒
(1 + r)
[
(1 + r)− βaλ 〈k
2〉
〈k〉 − βbλ
〈k2〉
〈k〉
]
= λ2
[ 〈k2〉
〈k〉
]2
[1− βb − βa] . (E.3)
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Solving equation (E.3), we find that the two eigenvalues are
r1 = λ
〈k2〉
〈k〉 − 1,
r2 = λ
〈k2〉
〈k〉 [βa + βb − 1]− 1.
As the maximum value that [βa + βb − 1] can take is 1, it is the case that
r2 ≤ r1 and therefore, also for all levels of homophily we find that the steady-
state in which no information survives is stable if and only if λ ≤ 〈k〉〈k2〉 .
Appendix F. Proof of Theorem 2
Simple substitution shows that θ¯aa = θ¯
b
a = 0 is a solution to equations (15)
and (16), while θ¯ab = θ¯
b
b = 0 is a solution of equations (17) and (18) respectively.
This is true irrespective of the degree of homophily in the population.
Similarly, θ¯ba = 0 and θ¯
a
a > 0 solve equation (16) if and only if βa = 1.
The same argument can be applied to all equations (15)-(18). Thus, if a meme
exhibits a positive steady-state in the group that prefers it and groups interact
to some extent, the same meme must also exhibit a positive steady-state in the
complement group.
Appendix G. Proof of Theorem 3
Information loss due to segregation is glρ˜− ρ¯l. For this term to be negative,
it is sufficient that glρ˜(k) < ρ¯l(k) for all k. As the lower bound for θ¯l is glθ˜, we
know that
ρ¯l(k) > gl
∑
k
P˜ (k)
kλθ˜
1 + glkλθ˜
> glρ˜(k).
I.e., for agents of any degree, segregation leads to an information loss for each
meme l ∈ {A,B}, and hence glρ˜ − ρ¯l < 0. Furthermore, a sufficient condition
for |gaρ˜− ρ¯a| > |gbρ˜− ρ¯b| is that |gaρ˜(k)− ρ¯(k)| > |gbρ˜(k)− ρ¯b(k)|. Note that
gaρ˜(k)− ρ¯a(k)
gbρ˜(k)− ρ¯b(k) =
ga
gb
ρ˜(k)− 1ga
kλθ¯a
1+kλθ¯a
ρ˜(k)− 1ga
kλθ¯a
1+kλθ¯b
(G.1)
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which is larger than 1 if and only if ga > gb, as then both terms on the right
hand side are larger than 1, while for gb > ga, they are both smaller than 1.
This immediately shows that
|gaρ˜(k)− ρ¯a(k)| > |gbρ˜(k)− ρ¯b(k)| (G.2)
if and only if ga > gb.
Appendix H. Proof of Theorem 4
Point 1:
An agent of degree k and group l prefers a segregated society over an integrated
one if
s
h
< ml(k),
where
ml(k) =
ρ˜(k)− ρ¯l(k)
ρ¯-l(k)
.
For l = A,
d ln(ma(k))
dk
=
λθ¯b
1 + kλθ¯b
− λθ˜
1 + kλθ˜
− λθ¯a
1 + kλθ¯a
(H.1)
=
λ
(1 + kλθ¯b)(1 + kλθ¯a)(1 + kλθ˜)
·
·
[
θ¯b − θ˜ − θ¯a − 2kλθ¯aθ˜ − k2λ2θ¯aθ¯bθ˜
]
which is always negative, as θ˜ > θ¯b. By symmetry,
d ln(mb(k))
dk < 0 holds as well.
It is therefore the case that for each group, agents that have more meetings per
period prefer an integrated society for a broader range of sh than agents with
fewer meetings.
Point 2:
The second claim of Theorem 4 is that for all k, mb(k) > ma(k) if and only if
ga > gb, i.e., for two agents with the same degree, the agent belonging to the
minority group prefers segregation for a broader range of sh . This holds if, for
46
ga > gb,
ma(k)
mb(k)
=
ρ˜(k)− ρ¯a(k)
ρ˜(k)− ρ¯b(k)
ρ¯a(k)
ρ¯b(k)
< 1. (H.2)
This condition can be re-written as
(ρ˜(k)− ρ¯a(k))ρ¯a(k) < (ρ˜(k)− ρ¯b(k))ρ¯b(k)
kλθ¯a
1 + kλθ¯a
[
kλθ˜
1 + kλθ˜
− kλθ¯a
1 + kλθ¯a
]
<
kλθ¯b
1 + kλθ¯b
[
kλθ˜
1 + kλθ˜
− kλθ¯b
1 + kλθ¯b
]
and through collecting terms, re-arranging, and making use of the fact that
θ¯b =
gb
ga
θ¯a, it can be simplified to
θ˜
[
1− k2λ2θ¯aθ¯b
]
<
1
ga
θ¯a + 2kλθ¯aθ¯b. (H.3)
This is satisfied, as we know that θ¯a > gaθ˜, i.e.,
1
ga
θ¯a > θ˜.
Appendix I. Proof of Proposition 5
For nl(k), we know from equation (I.3) and the definitions of θˆl and θˆ-l that
na(k) =
(1 + kλθ¯b)(1 + kλ(θ¯b − gbθ¯ab))
(1 + kλθ¯a)(1 + kλ(θ¯a + gbθ¯ab))
, (I.1)
nb(k) =
(1 + kλθ¯a)(1 + kλ(θ¯a − gaθ¯ab))
(1 + kλθ¯b)(1 + kλ(θ¯b + gaθ¯ab))
. (I.2)
We also have the following relationships:
• θ¯a > θ¯b if and only if ga > gb.
• θ¯a + gbθ¯ab =
∑
k P˜ (k)ρ¯a(k) and θ¯b + gaθ¯ab =
∑
k P˜ (k)ρ¯b(k), i.e., θ¯a +
gbθ¯ab > θ¯b + gaθ¯ab if and only if ga > gb.
• θ¯a− gaθ¯ab =
∑
k P˜ (k)ρ¯a(k)[1− ρ¯b(k)] and θ¯b− gbθ¯ab =
∑
k P˜ (k)ρ¯b(k)[1−
ρ¯a(k)], i.e., θ¯a − gaθ¯ab > θ¯b − gbθ¯ab if and only if ga > gb.
This implies that if ga > gb, the numerator of equation (I.1) is smaller than
the numerator of equation (I.2), while the denominator of (I.1) is larger than
the denominator of (I.2). Thus, if ga > gb, then na(k) < nb(k).
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The fact that integration is not a Nash equilibrium whenever segregation is
preferred by some agents follows directly from the following Lemma:
Lemma 6. For both l and all k, λ and P (k), it is the case that nl(k) ≥ ml(k),
with strict inequality for finite λ.
Proof. Employ the definitions of ρˆl(k) and ρˆ-l(k) to re-write nl(k) as
nl(k) =
θˆl − θ¯l
θ¯-l − θˆ-l
(1 + kλθ¯-l)(1 + kλθˆ-l)
(1 + kλθ¯l)(1 + kλθˆl)
. (I.3)
We define
θ¯ab ≡
∑
k
P˜ (k)
kλθ¯b
1 + kλθ¯b
kλθ¯a
1 + kλθ¯a
(I.4)
which allows us to write
θˆl =
∑
k
P˜ (k)ρ¯l(k) = θ¯l + g-lθ¯ab, (I.5)
θˆ-l =
∑
k
P˜ (k)ρ¯-l(k)[1− ρ¯l(k)] = θ¯-l − g-lθ¯ab, (I.6)
and equation (I.3) becomes
nl(k) =
(1 + kλθ¯-l)(1 + kλθˆ-l)
(1 + kλθ¯l)(1 + kλθˆl)
. (I.7)
In fact,
ml(k) =
ρ˜(k)− ρ¯l(k)
ρ¯-l(k)
=
1 + kλθ¯-l
1 + kλθ¯l
θ˜ − θ¯l
θ¯-l(1 + kλθ˜)
, (I.8)
which shows that nl(k) ≥ ml(k) if
1 + kλθˆ-l
1 + kλθˆl
≥ θ˜ − θ¯l
θ¯-l(1 + kλθ˜)
. (I.9)
We know from Proposition 4 that θ¯l > glθ˜. Therefore, the numerator of the
right-hand side of equation (I.9) is smaller than g-lθ˜, while θ¯-l > g-lθ˜, i.e., the
denominator in equation (I.9) is larger than g-lθ˜(1 + kλθ˜). By applying these
bounds, we know that the right-hand side of equation (I.9) is strictly less than
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1
1+kλθ˜
. Consequently, equation (I.9) is satisfied for sure if
1 + kλθˆ-l
1 + kλθˆl
≥ 1
1 + kλθ˜
⇒ (I.10)
(1 + kλθˆ-l)(1 + kλθ˜) ≥ 1 + kλθˆl. (I.11)
This, however, is always satisfied as θ˜ > θˆl and 1 + kλθˆ-l > 1. Finally,
we know that limλ→∞ml(k) = 0. As limλ→∞ ρ¯l(k) = 1 for both l, we find
that limλ→∞ θˆ-l = 0 and applying this we find that limλ→∞ nl(k) = 0, thus
ml(k) = nl(k) if and only if λ→∞.
Lemma 7. For both l, and all k, λ and P (k), it is the case that ηl(k) ≥ ml(k),
with strict inequality for finite λ and k. ηl(k) is decreasing in k, λ, and θ˜.
Proof. Lemma 7 is easiest proven by focusing on the fact that segregation is
preferred to integration if
hρ¯l(k) + sρ¯-l(k) < hρ˜(k), (I.12)
while segregation is a Nash equilibrium if
hρˇl(k) + sρˇ-l(k) < hρ˜(k). (I.13)
By the definition of ρˇl(k) and ρˇ-l(k), the fact that θ¯l > glθ˜ implies immediately
that ρ¯l(k) > ρˇl(k) and ρ¯-l(k) > ρˇ-l(k). It is therefore true that whenever
segregation is preferred by all members of group l, it is also a Nash equilibrium.
It is also immediate that the numerator of ml(k) is smaller than the numerator
of ηl(k), while the denominator of ml(k) is larger than the one of ηl(k).
Finally, we know that ml(k) goes to zero if either k or λ go to infinity. It
is straightforward to take the same limits directly in equation (23) to establish
that also ηl(k) goes to zero if either k or λ go to infinity. Similarly, from equation
(23) it is obvious that changes in k, λ, and θ˜ have the same qualitative effect
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on ηl(k). If we denote kλθ˜ ≡ x, we find that
dηl(k)
dk
=
−gl
(1 + x)2(1 + glx)2
[
2 + 2x+ g-lx
2
] dx
dk
< 0, (I.14)
dηl(k)
dλ
=
−gl
(1 + x)2(1 + glx)2
[
2 + 2x+ g-lx
2
] dx
dλ
< 0, (I.15)
dηl(k)
dθ˜
=
−gl
(1 + x)2(1 + glx)2
[
2 + 2x+ g-lx
2
] dx
dθ˜
< 0. (I.16)
As a FOSD shift in the degree distribution implies an increase in θ˜, the last
derivative proves that ηl(k) is indeed decreasing in such a shift.
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